

Responding to One Nation

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INTRODUCTION

Responding to One Nation is difficult, at least for some of us. A self-conscious anti-intellectualism and the mobilisation of apparent racists create significant problems for someone who values intellectual activity and is disturbed by the apparent validation of racist views. The difficulty increases for those of us who eschew conceptions of absolute or objective “truth”. Responding to One Nation as a sceptic, or someone who values reason yet denies the possibility of absolute or objective truth with respect to any non-trivial claims, requires both an exercise in will (toward tolerance¹) and considerable care. This paper is an attempt at such a response.

This paper has been organised into three main parts. The first deals with responses to One Nation from some Australian intellectuals. This section is headed “Against One Nation” because it is devoted to a brief discussion of the hostile responses from the intellectuals whose works are discussed. The second section is a brief discussion of scepticism. This section provides a necessary prelude to the final section, which provides an outline and response to two sets of problems that are central to One Nation’s analysis of Australian society and politics. These sets of problems are subsumed within the rubrics multiculturalism and elites.

1. Against One Nation

One of the main effects of One Nation has been that it has disrupted aspects of the familiarity of Australian politics. For Love the alarm that has greeted Pauline Hanson's 'message is largely due to the fact that she has launched a moderately popular challenge to the cosy Whiggish assumptions about moral progress in public policy.' (Love 1997: 25)² That a seemingly naïve and politically inept group of self-proclaimed anti-politicians have caused this disruption is fundamental to the disturbance that "One Nation" now signifies.

The response that has resulted from the disruption of the Whiggish certainties to which Love alluded makes for interesting reading. Some of the more interesting responses are those in which intellectual posit something of counter-truths to those presented by One Nation. One of the more interesting of these is to be found in the Ward, Leach and Stokes' *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*. Their introduction to this collection is a clear reminder of the enlightenment project with which modern intellectuals identify. Here we are told that 'One Nation illuminated a darker side of Australian politics...'. (Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000: 1) Of the contributors to this collection, the editors make clear that 'none writes with any sympathy regarding its policies. Several are overtly hostile to Pauline Hanson and to the ONP, its pronouncements and practices.' (Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000: 2) For the author's of the 'Introduction' 'reasoned critiques remain necessary, but countering Hansonite ideas with reason alone will not work.' (Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000: 18)³

One of the techniques intellectuals employ to 'counteract One Nation.' (Segal 1999: 167) is to associate it with some pre-discredited group or intellectual position. Gelder, for example, dismisses One Nation as a 'Nature Cult.' (1998: 760) Many others dismiss the party as populist.⁴ To be accused of populism is to be accused of promulgating paranoid conspiracy theory. One Nation's populism is characterised as a paranoid and defensive reaction to an ill-defined enemy of the people that occupies elite positions within society. Melleuish drew a parallel

between One Nation's construction of this elite (as represented in *The Truth* (Hanson 1997)) and preceding versions of this theory. The difference between the ideas presented in *The Truth* and preceding forms is that 'it operates less as a political or social category than as a metaphysical entity on whom all the evils of contemporary Australia can be heaped. Unlike previous accounts... virtually no attempt is made to ascertain, in concrete terms, who these people are.' (1997: 27)⁵

2. Post-Truth

This struggle to counteract or combat One Nation has some problems, however. In the first instance, it suggests a refusal to acknowledge the extent to which some members of Australian society maintain a commitment to values with which many of Australia's intellectuals, even some of the most conservative, are uncomfortable. This is not true of all intellectuals in Australia, but does appear true of a significant number of them. An important problem is that many of the hostile responses to One Nation seem to reflect an imagined Australia that should not partake of the sort of backward looking, racist and homophobic policies for which One Nation is "known". A more interesting problem here is that it often reflects a certainty about economics, politics, race and society that is unavailable to a sceptic.

Scepticism has had a very long history of western philosophy and has existed in a variety of forms.⁶ A sceptical position is one in which it is held that no belief in any proposition is epistemologically justifiable. Thus 'the correct explanation of our believing some body of propositions... is non-epistemic.' (Jones 2000: 435) If scepticism is anything, it is the view that, despite persistent claims to the contrary, beliefs do not reflect an absolute truth. Scepticism is not an irrationalist philosophical position, however, for the very derivation of a sceptical position is through the use of reason. In short, reason reveals the very limits of reason that places "truth" outside the range of possibilities for reason itself.

Scepticism may well be understood as the most rational of positions. Scepticism does not require the rejection of conversations governed by a concern with truth, but merely requires the suspension of the sort of certainty that access to truth provides for those who believe that they have discovered it.⁷

Scepticism is most commonly encountered in contemporary intellectual circles in the form of post-structuralism and postmodernism (though the referents of these terms are often interchangeable). Post-structuralism, associated with Foucault's works, appropriates scepticism and provides an account of the construction, and not the discovery, of truth. Post-structuralists, who follow Foucault, do not to suggest either that truth claims will not be made or that they will not be accepted by many of those engaged in conversations around truth. Indeed, many truth claims relate to matters so trivial few people would bother questioning them. Scepticism is only of real significance, in this context, when it comes to non-trivial truth claims. This kind of truth claims, within this account, are not a function of access to the way things really are but express, as Nietzsche might put it, the will to power of those who declare the truth.⁸ 'Such is the message everywhere implicit in Foucault's Nietzschean genealogies of power/knowledge: that truth-claims are always, inescapably bound up with the epistemic drive for mastery and control, even (or especially) where it masks behind a rhetoric of liberal-humanist values or emancipatory critique.' (Norris 1993: 257) That post-structuralism and post-modernism have become somewhat fashionable in contemporary intellectual circles has not extended to those who dismiss One Nation as "wrong" and as supported by those looking to what has been, at best, a past truth (but who do not have access to the real truth).

To approach One Nation without truth and in the belief that the difference that she articulates is felt powerfully within at least a tenth, and probably more, of Australian society creates an interesting, if uncomfortable, starting-point for this discussion of One Nation. That One Nation tends to reject the very being of an intellectual, and probably an academic, does not help. Yet, this is the basis upon

which I must respond to One Nation. One advantage of a sceptical position is that the disruption to the certainties that dominate intellectual, journalistic⁹ and political circles in Australia is an interesting starting-point for a consideration of how an academic and sceptic might respond to One Nation.

Two points must be made before a response can proceed, as it is important that no confusion exists in these respects. The first is that I am not pretending to offer the only truth available in this context. The second, that my truth (which is really only a sincerely held belief for which I can offer reasons) is fundamentally different to that offered by One Nation. I am merely seeking to engage to approach the views of One Nation with tolerance. In this, I am seeking to operationalise the minimal conception of tolerance presented by King. For him, tolerance refers to 'the most minimal of tolerential negations, where one does not suspend... a dislike or disapproval of an item, but does suspend, reduce or otherwise soften the negative act that might normally be regarded as following from the disapproval...'. (1998: 117) This is, no doubt, a troubling and difficult task. Yet, it seems a response that is preferable to many that One Nation has received. This tolerance leads me to act and think through the sort of doubt that Beck wondered about when he asked whether 'doubt... will create a space for others, and in the development of others, for me and us?' (1997: 162) I must admit to reservations, however, with respect to Beck's claim that 'scepticism... makes everything possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, criticism, morality, society, only differently, a few sizes smaller, more preliminary, revisable, and more able to learn.' (163) I do not doubt, however, that scepticism can provide a basis for questions and dialogue and it is toward this that this paper is aimed.

3. Responding to One Nation

Introduction

This section constitutes my response to One Nation. While there are other texts that might be organised around what Foucault referred to as the “author function” (Foucault 1984), this response to One Nation has been generated on the basis of an engagement with speeches delivered by Pauline Hanson and documents found on the One Nation website.¹⁰ Two concerns about Australian life and society dominate these texts. These concerns are the effects of multiculturalism and elites. In short, multiculturalism and elites constitute a threat to Australian society and must be opposed and their effects reversed. In the following sections, I will present One Nation’s ideas with respect to the effects of multiculturalism and elites and respond to the concerns that they signify.

A. Multiculturalism

If there is anything against which One Nation stands it is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, for One Nation, is a threat to Australian, and indeed every other, society. In Australia the policy will, if it continues, end in the demise of a distinctive Australian culture and polity. While immigration is an important element of multiculturalism, the link is not complete. For One Nation it is ‘inappropriately high levels of immigration *combined* with the policy of multiculturalism [that] has led to a serious breakdown in the social cohesion of Australia.’ (Hanson 1999 emphasis added) Multiculturalism constitutes, according to One Nation, a “two-pronged” attack on Australian society, for it is an attack on both Australian culture and the Australian polity. In the first instance, multiculturalism represents a threat to the idea of Australianness to which One Nation is committed. In the second, it represents a threat to citizenship in Australia. These are related concerns but merit separate treatment, as they raise different issues and seem to require different responses.

Australianness

While the notion of Australianness can only make sense as a social construct, there can be little doubt that it is important to One Nation's understanding of the nature and implications of multiculturalism. Understanding and responding to the way that One Nation is using it as part of their criticisms and rejection of multiculturalism, then, constitutes both a means for understanding views expressed by One Nation with respect to multiculturalism and for responding to them.

i. One Nation on Australianness

A central part of the political project in which One Nation feels itself to be engaged is a defence of Australianness. That One Nation's members' and supporters' identities are understood in terms of belonging to a specific culture is clear. As Hanson put it, 'every variety of culture in Australia today has a mother country where their particular culture can survive and develop. Our unique Australian culture and identity has nowhere else in the world in which to survive.' (One Nation 2001a) Authentic¹¹ Australianness, as Hanson sees it, has a variety of components. It originates with the early settlers, incorporates Aboriginal culture, reflects the Anzac spirit, and is marked by toughness and fairness. (Hanson 1997: 14-15) In a speech to the Australian Reform Party (Victoria) designed to 'expand and define' what she said in her maiden speech to Parliament, Hanson argued that 'mainstream Australia is firmly based on its Anglo-Celtic-European heritage, Judaeo-Christian beliefs, English law and Westminster parliamentary system.' (Hanson 1997: 12)

Australianness is under threat from a variety of sources, however, and these threats require that Australian culture be defended. (Hanson 1997: 15) The most

important threat comes from those migrants who do not commit themselves to this Australian culture. In short, Australianness cannot be defended if Australians do not require a commitment to that culture from everyone in Australia. Immigration is not the problem. Immigration on the part of those who do not wish to participate in this Australian culture is. Recent immigration has been characterised, in Hanson's view, by the acceptance of people who do not respect or value Australian culture. Immigration is acceptable as long as 'migrants who choose Australia as their permanent homeland should, as part of their decision to migrate, *have a genuine desire to embrace and enjoy Australia's cultural values, life style and freedoms as they have evolved.*' (One Nation 2001a)¹²

Only those immigrants who are able to adapt to Australian culture are desirable to One Nation. Immigrants have always been important to Australia but desirable immigrants 'had one thing in common, they joined in. They did not stand back on the fringe of the Australian community, expecting special privileges. These people became Australians, body and soul and many of them died for their homeland.' (Hanson 1997: 21) Immigrant are not being called upon to abandon 'their cultural heritage but they must realise that the celebration of their cultural heritage must be at their expense and not that of the ordinary taxpayer.' (Hanson 1997: 21)

An essential part, if not source, of Australianness can be found in agriculture. This reflects both Australia's past and present. More specifically One Nation defends the "family farm" as an essential part of Australian culture. It is for this reason that One Nation committed itself to a rural apprenticeship scheme 'aimed at providing young people from rural backgrounds and whose families are on the land to continue to work on the family farm.' (One Nation 2001a)¹³ For 'One Nation recognises the history and the tradition of the family farm and its enormous contribution to our nation's economic, cultural and social well being. One Nation supports the right to farm and ... will review and amend or repeal existing legislation that threatens that right.' [Primary]

One Nation is not only committed to a defence of farming and the family farm, it is also committed to the “reindustrialisation” of Australia. In part, this is recognition of the role that manufacture has played in Australian life.¹⁴ For ‘Australia was once a proud, strong, manufacturing nation.’ (Australia 1997b: 7706) Reindustrialisation will address problems associated with unemployment and under employment.¹⁵ It will also create the conditions that will make possible a much more harmonious society than presently exists in Australia. As ‘a busy, industrious community is usually a happy one, and that is far from the situation today.’ (Hanson 1997: 33)

Addressing unemployment and the social decline associated with de-industrialisation, however, do not exhaust the intended outcomes of reindustrialisation. Reindustrialisation will also promote a “self-sufficient” Australia. (Australia 1998a: 1469) One Nation intends to create ‘an Australia that is industrially self sufficient, economically independent, strong and prosperous, and which provides meaningful and rewarding lives for all of its people.’

[Manufacturing] For ‘if a country has an agricultural base from which to feed the people, industrial infrastructure, a skilled manufacturing base, oil and mineral resources, and a healthy, united population, it has the essentials to become self-sufficient.’ (One Nation 2001a)

ii. Responding

The first problem with any rejection of One Nation’s conception of Australianness is that it is in danger of constituting an alternative truth. Those intellectuals who cleave to a different understanding of self and nation are simply cleaving to this alternative understanding. Their position is no less culturally specific and no less in service of particular interests.¹⁶ They may defend those interests and will dominate political debates and their view will probably “win” but this simply reflects the power that we are able to mobilise in defence of their

position. They may reject ethno-nationalism¹⁷, but we do so as an expression of their commitment to an alternative conception of being and belonging. This is not a reflection of being more reasonable.¹⁸ It is an exercise of power.¹⁹

There seem to be two problems associated with a victory in this context. The first is that it is not the victory of reason and fundamentally misrepresents itself when this is claimed. Second, we cannot be certain, and have few parallel cases upon which to rely for any certainty, that this strategy is likely to meet with long term success. In short, we do not know what problems may be associated with denying the validity or need to participate in the generation of constructs like authentic Australianness.²⁰ Even if we eschew authentic Australianness in defence of our culturally specific resistance to such a notion we are yet to address the role that these constructs may play in unifying communities (including that unity that is produced by resistance to dominant authenticities).²¹ The question that arises in this context, then, concerns whether we would have to invent such a thing as authentic Australianness if such a thing did not exist (and it certainly has no existence separate from those social processes that create these phenomena).

Responding to One Nation's construction of authentic Australianness seems to require examining questions that are associated with the nature and necessity of a national identity for any country. That we have experienced a number of state sponsored programmes designed to create or solidify forms of national identity may well constitute a reason to be suspicious with respect to these notions.²² We may reject any attempts to define or project a national identity and risk problems sometimes associated with a lack of national identity. Alternatively, we may acknowledge their importance and seek to develop a form of national identity with which we are comfortable.

One of the central questions here concerns what we might expect of immigrants. Castles' has responded to One Nation's call for an acceptance of the fact that a decision to migrate need not imply any commitment to the core values of the country to which migration occurs.²³ This seems a difficult position to

defend and explain to anyone not in full sympathy with what might be understood as a post-national environment. This is more than simply an alternative understanding of national belonging. For any rejection of One Nation's conception of Australianness that relies upon some minimal commitment to core values will reflect a particular set of predispositions with respect to identity and belonging. Those who reject One Nation's position with respect to what ought to be required of immigrants may not fear their strangeness²⁴, but will be unlikely to tolerate all forms of difference (in particular that form of difference which negates another's difference). Civic nationalists²⁵ are unlikely to tolerate all the attitudes and values that these diaspora may reflect. McMillan's calls for a plural or dual conception of identity²⁶ is no less troubling, as it seems to imply that we abandon our defence of some of the values that underpin a rejection of One Nation.

Even if communities do not rely on a common commitment to certain values for their very existence, individuals may find it difficult, if not impossible, to eschew the values to which they are committed and through which they make sense of themselves. Scepticism and the cynicism that it requires with respect to debates of this sort, in short, cuts both ways. It requires avoiding the view that reasonable and disinterested seekers of truth are opposed to those mindlessly committed to misguided essentialism and bigotry. In the end, an engagement with One Nation is a power struggle.

The central question concerns the point of that power struggle. It is not difficult to imagine, at least from where I sit, that One Nation will be beaten. It only ever gets between 10-25% of the primary votes. Its conception of Australianness is relatively easily projected as out of date. Its supporters seem generally inarticulate and its parliamentarians ill-disciplined. Nor is it difficult to defend the view that Australian agricultural practices, applied by the family farm, has not been a particularly effective means of managing the land. Reindustrialisation and self-sufficiency are readily dismissed as quaint, if not impossible.

There may be little need to respond to One Nation with anything but the glee of the victor. Yet this seems troubling. In part, because One Nation reflects something of the concerns about Australian society that are being expressed in a variety of ways (most notably by environmental movements and protesters against so-called globalisation) and which identify a variety of disturbing trends. Second, because it involves negating the views of a significant, if not dominant, number of Australians. These Australians are deeply anxious about themselves and their futures. They are uncertain as to whether they are valued and they certainly do not appear to have a coherent “voice” within the two-party system. We may well decide that we do not value supporters of One Nation and may need to tell them so. This is different from telling them that they are wrong or wrong-headed. Perhaps we need simply wait for them to die and take their conception of Australianness with them.

A more interesting possibility lies in mobilising this sense of authentic national identity in order to further a political project. McMillan seems to be both on the right and wrong tracks in the following (which is not in the context of a discussion of One Nation, but offers interesting possibilities). She suggests that ‘in a political age when socialism has become the analysis that dares not speak its name, and when there has been a systematic dumbing-down in popular understanding of how economic power shapes lives, the politics of national identity can too easily become a dim-witted substitute for the politics of real solidarity with people facing the same economic pressures and problems.’ (McMillan 1996: 31) McMillan’s analysis is interesting in terms of her identification of the possibility for those critical of contemporary Australian society to mobilise the sorts of sentiments that Hanson articulates.²⁷ McMillan is misguided in her suggestion that there exists something called “real solidarity” and neglects the possibility that being “dim-witted” may have certain advantages.

Citizenship

Even if we do not accept the cultural aspects of the definition of Australianness that is implicit in One Nation literature, those of us with an interest in politics may remain interested in the issues that are raised with respect to citizenship. While the notions can be understood to be strongly related, the concept of citizenship refers to quite a different aspect of the problem that One Nation has with multiculturalism. If their concern with Australianness reflects worries about immigrants not valuing and participating in the culture, concerns about citizenship seem to reflect disquiet about whether immigrants will accept and play by the “rules” that govern political life in Australia. Of course, one of the rules is that a commitment to being an Australian requires taking up citizenship, but citizenship gives rise to many more and different issues to those that reflect the construction and pursuit of Australianness.

iii. One Nation on Citizenship

The conception of citizenship that underpins One Nation’s response to multiculturalism has three main elements. It is based on an understanding of rights as belonging to individuals and not to groups. Second, citizenship, and the rights that citizens claim, brings with it a set of responsibilities that are to be equally distributed across all members of the community and identical for all citizens. One Nation attacks multiculturalism because it is understood to have involved a refusal to accept the responsibilities of citizenship on the parts of some people who claim rights as Australian citizens. The third aspect of One Nation’s understanding of citizenship is that it cannot be used as a vehicle for pursuing difference. That is, citizenship is not, from their perspective, to be used to promote interests that are different from those of Australians as a whole.

The understanding of citizenship that appears throughout One Nation literature consistently identifies rights as belonging to individuals and not groups.

Rights adhere to individuals as a function of their similarity and do not emerge from their differences. For 'if we are ever to all live together as Australians, we must stop the division caused by the senseless and destructive agenda that insists on highlighting our differences – we must all be treated equally. ... we must help people on the basis of individual need.' (One Nation 1997a) It is only when rights are understood to belong to all people and to be identical amongst all people that it becomes possible, from this perspective, to create a functioning community.

'Australians must be treated equally and we must be one people, under one flag and with one set of rules if we are to ever truly live together as Australians.' (One Nation 1997c) In order to live together 'we must all be Australians together, either we are equal in all things or we are equal in none.' (One Nation 1997d)

To choose to be a citizen of a country is to accept both the same rights as all others in the community and to accept the same responsibilities as all others. 'Citizenship does not mean getting everything Australia has to offer and giving nothing in return. People often talk about their rights, but what about their responsibilities to Australia?' (Australia 1996c: 8095) Primary amongst these responsibilities is absolute loyalty to one's country. Ethnic background is irrelevant to a first-class citizen 'provided of course that they give this country their full, undivided loyalty.' (Australia 1996a: 3862) All Hanson asks, in this context, 'is that any Australian, regardless of their origin, should give Australia their full and undivided loyalty.' (Hanson 1997: 25) The decision to become an Australian citizen has to be understood as an undertaking to commit oneself to Australia. An oath of citizenship, then, must involve 'a firm promise by those who come here to join them [Australians] as citizens of this great nation to be willing to give a clear and unambiguous commitment of loyalty where there can be no room for higher loyalties to other nations or people.' Citizenship is not to be taken lightly. 'Exchanging allegiance from one's country of origin, with its history, values, laws and customs, to another is an important step.' (Australia 1996b: 6374)

The most important aspect of citizenship is that it produces a single nation that all citizens work to promote. The question for Australians concerns 'whether we are to be one people belonging to one nation or many peoples belonging to many nations.' (Australia 1997c: 8898) One Nation, then, is a vehicle for resisting 'pressures from various minority groups that are seeking to create more than one Australia.' (Hanson 1997: 29) This resistance is necessary because 'a truly multicultural country can never be strong or united, as continual friction and conflict is created by rivalry between people with ethnic and religious differences. In Australia, multiculturalism... is a divisive policy that puts people in compartments and prevents them joining the mainstream society.' (Hanson 1997: 19-20)

iv. Responding

For those of us who reject essentialism, "rights" are social constructs that fulfil certain functions in a society and polity. They constitute useful parts of the bargaining processes in which individual and groups engage. There can be little doubt, though, that those who see rights as having some connection to a human essence can disagree as to the source and nature of those rights. One Nation seems to cleave to a classical liberal construction of rights which is both current and powerful in national and international contexts. This conception treats claims of group rights, which seem central to the discourses of multiculturalism, as less meaningful than other types of rights.²⁸ If all rights are nonsensical, unless understood simply as parts of social and political bargaining processes, then the central issue is that of the utility of a conception and practice of rights. That people in minority groups that those usually forced to make rights claims is a reflection of the fact that dominant majorities rarely need to assert rights.

That One Nation has problems with a failure of rights to be associated with duties and that these duties are not equally distributed or identical across all Australians is both usual and unusual. Usual in the sense that all citizens are regularly encouraged to accept that rights are linked to duties or responsibilities. Unusual in the sense that concern is being evidenced with respect to the failure on the part of *some* Australians to accept and fulfil these responsibilities. Their concern appears to be that some groups are “free riders” who claim benefits and deny responsibilities as it suits them. This point of view is interesting to the extent to which it implies that claims of group rights may undermine commitments that would lead to the acceptance of responsibilities to the larger whole.²⁹ It is an interesting, but not obviously valid, point.

The position that rights claims are being used to pursue, articulate, and preserve difference raises yet more interesting issues. The history of rights claims seems to indicate that they are most likely to be made by people discontented with their treatment in societies that are amenable to claims that reflect liberal-democratic principles. To this extent, they can be used in the protection or promotion of difference. Yet, I am not aware of a right to be different and, indeed, wonder whether anyone who was too different from me can claim a right (i.e., whether they speak enough of my language for me to recognise that they are making a claim). In short, there may well be some internal constraint upon the sort of differences that rights claims may support.

There appear to be two problems with respect to responses to One Nation in this context. The first is that these responses sometimes rely on the idea that there exists the possibility for a superior conception of citizenship. This is central to Castles’ quest for multicultural citizenship.³⁰ Castles is prepared to rely upon, but does not seem to accept all of the implications of Charles Taylor’s suggestion ‘that political ideas and institutions are the expression of a certain range of cultures, and may be incompatible with other ranges.’ (Castles 1997: 9????) If Taylor is correct, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, then any set of political institutions

and ideas that are constructed to reflect “multicultural citizenship” will continue to reflect a certain range of cultures. Yet Castles is disappointed that ‘multiculturalism has developed in an ad hoc way as a strategy for integrating immigrant communities into a basically unchanged society.’ (Castles 1997: 14-5)

Miller provides an interesting point of entry for a consideration of such issues in his presentation of republican citizenship, which involves liberal theories of citizenship as a set of rights with a commitment on the part of citizens to promote a common good. Miller must add to liberal theories of citizenship because there can be no guarantee that citizens will seek to promote a collective interest. Two possibilities seem to emerge in this context; either citizens are expected to promote a collective interest or they are not. If they are not, then we can understand their use of rights language as a vehicle to promote their interests (sometimes represented as a group interest). Such a language is indeed powerful, even for those of us who do not believe in rights. As Green has pointed out ‘the language of rights is especially appropriate for Aboriginal contestation of settler-state dominance, not because colonial law will generate justice, but because rights language contains the necessary political and legal power for engagement in the struggle for a measure of liberation.’ (Green 2000: 134)

If, in Miller’s republican citizenship model, citizens are constrained to justify their claims by reference to a collective interest, this creates the problem that certain types of claim will not be supported. For ‘republican citizenship cannot accommodate everything that passes under the name of “the politics of identity”’. (Miller 1995: 446) Miller argues that citizenship understood in this way requires that citizens express their interests in such a way that it is understood to reflect something of their membership of a wider community.

The republican conception of citizenship... places no limits on what sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum. It does not discriminate between demands stemming from personal conviction – say demands for animal

rights – and demands stemming from group identity – say demands for religious schooling. In all cases the success of any particular demand will depend upon how far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from, the general political ethos of the community. (Miller 1995: 447)

As Love has suggested, Hanson 'is identifying one of the enduring dilemmas for multicultural, democratic nation states. The problem is how to reconcile the claims made by a plurality of cultural groups yet retain a core set of rights and responsibilities which constitute an acceptable doctrine of common citizenship.' (Love 1997: 26)

Criticisms that conceptions of citizenship are based on the construction of communal interests may be well founded (Young 1990), but they appear to miss the larger political issues raised by this. These relate to whether citizens, and the debates within which they participate, are to be governed by any concern with a collective interest. If not, then they seem to require presentation either in terms of the defence of some essential humanity, which seems unavailable to a sceptic, or they are to be expressed in terms of political power (i.e., the claim that a felt need ought to be recognised because it reflects the ability of a group to cause disruption – most likely to a politician's career). That those who identify with white Anglo-Australianness are the ones most likely to be disruptive raises an interesting issue here.

Another problem that arises in this context is that the emergence of group rights appears disruptive to many conceptions of individual rights. This has often been noted (particularly by some feminists).³¹ In response, Kymlicka accepts that group rights may crosscut, if not disrupt, individual rights, but believes that the problem is not as significant as some commentators believe.

In many cases, group rights supplement and strengthen human rights, by responding to potential injustices that traditional rights doctrine cannot address.

These are the “good” group rights. There are cases, to be sure, where illiberal groups seek the right to restrict the basic liberties of their members. These are the “bad” group rights. In some cases, these illiberal practices are not only bad, but intolerable, and the larger society has a right to intervene to stop them. But in other cases, liberal states must tolerate unjust practices within a minority group. Drawing the line between the bad and the intolerable is one of the thorniest issues liberal democracies face. (Kymlicka 1996: 22)

Kymlicka’s solution may be good philosophy, but it seems to represent difficult politics. That it also seems to avoid addressing the problem that group rights may interfere with the individual rights of citizens who are not part of the groups claiming rights is another problem.

Kymlicka has identified only one problem associated with the promotion of group rights (that groups may claim a right to restrict the individual rights of their members). Other, and possibly more difficult, issues relate to the fora and processes through which allocations of resources will be made in the face of rights claims. The fora may well be occupied by a variety of rights claims from citizens, some of which reflect individual rights and some group rights. Curthoys and Johnson believe that a reason that we may well be stuck with the politics and rhetoric of One Nation, probably even after its demise, is because ‘it touches one of the most complex and important issues of our times, that of ‘equal’ treatment, sameness and difference, and the problem of how social and economic policy ought to respond to their competing demands.’ (Curthoys and Johnson 1998: 100)

Conclusion

While rejecting notions of essential Australianess is likely to come from those who adopt civic-nationalist ideologies, there is no guarantee that such a rejection is a sound strategy. In part, because the consequences of a rejection of

national identity are not clear. In part, because civic nationalists, and anyone who adopts a relatively minimal understanding of belonging, are unlikely to empty their conception of belonging sufficiently to cope with all forms of difference. Anyone who believes that people are to live to certain minimal standards will want those standards to be uniformly practised and systematically reinforced through social structures. Those who expect some degree of commitment to the nation on the parts of all citizens, or loyalty, may find it impossible to negotiate a polity in which others do not feel this loyalty. Once again, the consequences of the excision of loyalty from citizenship remain unclear.³² Some redefinition of loyalty may be possible, but such a redefinition may prove difficult.

B. Elites

One Nation's other central concern is with respect to the dominating and corrupting effects that elites are having on Australian politics and society. In short, One Nation believes that an elite that conspires to promote its interests over that of all other Australians dominates Australian politics. The only possible exception to this is the treatment of Aborigines, who have been granted privileges and support (primarily through, what has been termed within One Nation literature, the Aboriginal industry). The extent to which Aborigines have been provided with privileges and support is, for One Nation, both evidence of the power of elites and the extent to which they will promote their own interests above that of other Australians. The following discussion has been divided into two parts. In the first I will discuss and respond to the view that an elite that is protecting its own interests against that of non-Aboriginal Australians dominates Australian politics. In the second I will outline and respond to One Nation's criticisms of the treatment of Aborigines in Australia.

Australian Politics

i. One Nation on Australian Politics

A rejection of the major parties is a starting-point for One Nation's denunciation of Australian politics as dominated by an elite. These are represented as dominated by a self-interested, city-based and internationalist elite. These politicians pursue policies that are designed to promote their own interests, to the detriment of ordinary, non-elite, Australians. These major party politicians and complicit bureaucrats are members of or servants for a local elite that appears linked to an international elite (which is the principal beneficiary of globalisation). One hundred years of self government, in Hanson's view, 'sees us as a country controlled by multi nationals, United Nations Treaties and career politicians who have no more concern or ability to look after the Australian people, than they do their own electorate.' (One Nation 2001b)

While One Nation's attack on the major political parties can be understood as a strategy essential to the mobilisation of a protest vote, it also reflects a construction of Australian politics as dominated by an elite. Central to this is the exclusion of ordinary Australians. from public debate (particularly in the context of multiculturalism and immigration).³³ 'For almost five decades the management of our country has been left to career politicians who... [cannot] relate to ordinary Australians when more times than not, they have never had to risk their capital, fear losing their home because of a mortgage, face family hardships because of financial pressures...'. (One Nation 2001b)

While these politicians are self-serving, they also work in the interests of "international interests". Hanson expressed a suspicion 'that the government has confused national interest with international interest... [and] that the government's policy to internationalise us is flawed and will only destroy Australia and the lifestyle of Australian people.' (Australia 1997d: 11014) Australian politicians in her view 'are working for the internationalists, not the Australian people.

Successive Liberal and Labor governments... have worked for the interests of just about everyone except the Australian people who elected them and pay them.'

(Australia 1997d: 11014) The ultimate consequence of the government's policies is that Australian governments will no longer control domestic affairs. The federal government, under the leadership of John Howard,

enthusiastically advocates a reduced role for itself in the governing of Australia as we become internationalised. It suggests that as Australia merges into the world economy, domestic and foreign policy will merge and democratically elected government will have less control of Australian affairs. This also means that the Australian people will have less say in how this country is run. (Australia 1997d: 11016)

ii. Responding

The argument that the major parties are part of an elite structure that causes particular interests to be promoted over the general interest has had a long history. Indeed, these sorts of positions have been systematically presented from both the left and right for as long as there have been a left and right in Australian politics. For the left, it is the control of the ruling class (who have expanded from the owners of the means of production to those who manage both the economic and political aspects of society). For the right, it is either the promulgators of welfare or social liberalism or the political correct.

There seems to be considerable evidence that Australian society is dividing into those who are benefiting from the policies often described as promoting globalisation, and those who do not. Classical and neo-classical liberals, and those conservatives who promote classical liberal ideas as the only legitimate ideology in Australia, would suggest that this divide is simply a reflection of fundamental

human difference and registers the normal inequality to be expected, perhaps even promoted, in any free society. Those who are being left behind because of “globalisation” cannot cope with the new economic and social realities and may be provided with some sort of social safety net, but little more. Many of them may be understood to seek to resist policies that reflect current realities, in this narrative, because they are lazy or inefficient (or both). There is no elite conspiracy, from this perspective, to preserve and enhance elite power and status to the detriment of everyone else. The inequality that One Nation identifies and criticises is, for the most part, simply a function of natural difference and the failure on the part of some people to acquire the skills that are necessary for success in the real world.

Almost of necessity, One Nation’s position is expressed without a significant level of sophistication. Sophistication is to be associated with the major parties, politicians in general and bureaucrats, as a result, is eschewed in favour of a lack of sophistication (which the more cynical might perceive to be a calculated projection of a lack of sophistication). This creates a problem, as unsophisticated claims of elite domination end up sounding like, if not being, conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories have been associated with people with a variety of intellectual and social pathologies. The problem for One Nation is that it cannot present a sophisticated theory and analysis of elite domination and must end up sounding like, and possibly being, the sort of conspiracy theorists who have been systematically denied legitimacy.

There can be little doubt that One Nation is plays to persistent, and apparently deeply entrenched, hostility toward politicians and bureaucrats and the decline in support for the major parties that also seems to mark recent Australian elections. (See Smith 2001) Given that neither the left or the right are yet to effectively promulgate an analysis and response to elitism in Australia means that the attack on elitism from One Nation seems to be the only one with any real political purchase.

The problem here, as Fletcher and Whipp suggest, is that there may have been something of a failure in leadership but that this failure does not seem amenable to articulation in anything but the terms of One Nation. The question that arises, at least from my perspective, concerns not simply whether there has been a failure of leadership but how this failure can be meaningfully discussed in public fora. As Fletcher and Whipp point out people who do not like present policies which seem to disproportionately favour the well-off, have no issue representation; and they have no social representation because their 'representatives' have different experiences and ways of seeing things, a different language, and no immediate experience of real economic pain. ... it is in this sense that James Jupp, in his discussion of One Nation and populism, talks about leaders who are not like ordinary people but are much more like each other than politicians from the opposing parties used to be. (Fletcher and Whipp 2000: 81)

The existence of a self-conscious conspiracy seems a difficult thing to affirm and substantiate and any claim of this nature risks exclusion as "irrational". Developing a sophisticated analysis of inequality in Australia as a reflection of the dynamics of international capitalism, domination of a discursive formation, ideological hegemony (or any other versions of this position) seems impossible to articulate in a meaningful way. Certainly it cannot be done in a way that is comprehensible to those who lack the necessary intellectual capital to understand the notions. This seems to be reflected in Curthoys and Johnson's assessment of the situation. 'If, as many theorists of globalisation suggest, the world is increasingly dominated by international cosmopolitan metropolises such as Sydney, London and New York, with economically depressed hinterlands, then One Nation's appeal in rural areas and small towns seems a sign of the times.' (1998: 97-8)

Aborigines

iii. One Nation on Aborigines

Statements from One Nation concerning immigration and Aborigines are probably the two for which it is best known. The party is often accused of being racist as a result of these statements. In the case of Aborigines, One Nation makes two general types of claims. The first is that Aborigines can be understood to enjoy privileges and supports not available to other Australians. They claim that non-Aboriginal Australians are suffering from racist policies that exclude them from participating in government programmes and deny them benefits to which Aborigines have access. The second, and related, claim is that there exists an “Aboriginal industry”, which generates these privileges and supports.

Hanson has argued consistently that neither she nor One Nation is racially prejudiced. Her position is that it is the major parties that have practised racism by using race as a basis for distributing social and economic benefits. ‘Racism in Australia has been entrenched by successive Liberal and Labor governments. It is clear that rather than trying to bring Australians from everywhere together, government policies have highlighted our differences and divided us with special benefits available to certain races.’ (One Nation 1997c) The consequence of distributing social and economic benefits on the basis of race, is, according to Hanson, to discriminate against disadvantaged people of non-Aboriginal descent. ‘Why the financial burdens and hardships on families of comparable incomes differ due to ‘Aboriginality’ is a mystery. Yet the gulf between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians is set to widen further.’ (Hanson 1997: 44) Hanson is not suggesting that Aborigines do not experience disadvantage ‘but there equally is no doubt that they are not on their own in their suffering either now or in the past.’ (Australia 1997e: 11972)

One Nation's discussion of the treatment of Aborigines appears based on a zero sum game model. As benefits increase for one group, they decrease for another. Thus 'while it is true that many Aboriginal people are not working and that they are living in appalling conditions... they do not have a monopoly on being disadvantaged, as it is also true that a million other Australians are not working and... feel little hope for the future...'. (Australia 1997c: 8900)³⁴ In short, Hanson does not 'believe that the colour of one's skin determines whether you are disadvantaged.' (Australia 1996a: 3860)

The complaint that emerges from One Nation is that needs on the part of non-Aboriginal Australians are not being addressed when they are being addressed with respect to Aborigines. 'One Nation policy of for all Australians to be treated equally. Medical, dental and surgical services will be made available on the basis of need and not on the basis of race.' (One Nation 1997e) The problem is that Australian society has been bifurcated and that this prevents any possibility that Aboriginal Australians will be included in the "mainstream". 'The social security, health and employment services in this country are far from perfect, but they offer better services integrated into the rest of the community than ATSIC.' (Australia 1997a: 4126)

One of the impediments to any attempt to change the treatment of Aborigines in Australia is the existence of what One Nation refers to as the "Aboriginal industry". While the exact nature of this industry is unclear, it may be most clearly traced by examining the beneficiaries of systems that provide support for Aborigines. 'In response to my call for equality for all Australians, the most noisy criticism came from the fat cats, bureaucrats and the do-gooders. They screamed the loudest because they stand to lose the most—their power, money and position, all funded by ordinary Australian taxpayers.' (Australia 1996a: 3861) Even Ray Martin is accused of failing to act professionally in not having 'divorced himself from the bias you would expect from his close links with the Aboriginal

industry and those who discredit decent Aboriginal Australians with their obvious and grubby grab for money.’ (Australia 1998b: 4697)³⁵

iv. Responding

The statements about Aborigines that emerge from One Nation are some of the most disturbing of their claims. Not because such claims are made, as Australian society has always contained and will probably always contain people who are antipathetic to Aborigines and, more particularly, Aborigines who refuse white culture (please note that I am not assuming that white culture is available to them, so their “refusal” is constructed). It is difficult to imagine that anyone in Australia could feel themselves to be so badly off that they perceive Aborigines to be doing better than they are.³⁶ The sense of alienation that these people feel has to be unimaginable to most readers of this paper (given that readership reflects both the position of a degree of intellectual capital which allows it to both obtain and understand this paper). It is this aspect of the claims of One Nation that are the most disturbing, for they may indicate a failure of inclusion or sensitivity to a section of the Australian community.

We may be relieved that it is a relatively small percentage of the population may be a relief and, on this basis, may justify a lack of concern for this relatively small group of people. As Jackman has pointed out, however, Australians seem to be closer to One Nation’s views on race than they are to the major parties.³⁷ The number of people, however, who may share in this view of Aborigines as privileged may well be greater than is registered in support for One Nation.

Perhaps the only thing more troubling than knowing that there are people who think this way is the possibility that they will be ignored. As Badcock has pointed out, stress is being felt in many parts of Australia. In his view, ‘there are many more ‘stressed-out’ communities scattered throughout our big cities than in regional Australia. These industrial suburbs have borne the brunt of structural

adjustment in Australia and are home to more than their share of working class “battlers” who feel that they have been treated like second-class citizens by a succession of unconcerned governments.’ (Badcock 1998: 241) As Badcock also points out, these people feel completely abandoned by and alienated from Australian politics. For him, the refusal of successive federal governments to properly help these ‘forgotten places’ and ‘excluded citizens’ to adjust to new economic and cultural realities has fuelled their sense of being expendable, and sown the seeds for the rise of ‘One Nation’. More and more people, whether in isolated country towns or on peripheral housing estates in the cities, have suffered a mounting sense of marginalisation and isolation to the point where ultimately they feel excluded as citizens by a political process that seems not to notice to care about their daily struggle for survival. (Badcock 1998: 242)

One of the main problems with One Nation’s analysis is that it may well be true that there *is* a zero sum game at work. As successive federal governments have reduced social services and the provision of welfare, the battle for the remainder of the funds may be akin to a zero sum game. While One Nation’s analysis of the situation has allowed for the mobilisation of racism in Australia, we would do well not to forget that those in marginal communities find themselves in competition with one another for the limited support that seems to be available for social welfare programmes. That these people are marginal and, as a result, in a situation in which they have little contact with or sense of how the truly privileged lives may explain something of their response to the treatment of Aborigines. The view from the bottom of Australian society precludes a clear perception of the top and may produce a focus on the “privileged” amongst the visible.

The notion of an Aboriginal industry is also one that merits more careful attention than it has received. Literature on policy communities, as well as post-structuralist theories of discursive communities, suggests that the notion of an

Aboriginal industry may be meaningful. The construction of knowledge about Aborigines and their problems is, for those of us familiar with post-structuralist discourse analysis, discursively constituted through relationships of power. This power produces objects, experts and disciplinary regimes (imbued with systems of patronage) that may well be understood in terms of an industry.³⁸ This industry, if we follow this intellectual position further, provides structures of inclusion and exclusion that legitimise certain constructions of the Aboriginal problem and deny legitimacy to others. I have little doubt that One Nation will have little effect on this discursive community and that this community will continue to construct the object/problem “Aborigines” and will administer this “problem”. Nor do I have much doubt that this discursive community will continue to direct its, predominantly white, gaze at Aborigines.

Policy network theory, provide a similar analytical framework. While this framework has a variety of forms, each emphasises a network that produces the policy that governs responses to interests and issues.³⁹ One of the most important aspects of a policy network is that it produces continuity of political response to issues or problems. Marsh and Rhodes

suggest that the existence of a tight policy network constrains the policy agenda and tends to result in policy continuity. The best example in Britain is the way in which the very close relations between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the National Farmers’ Union underpinned a policy of high production and high subsidies for over 50 years from the 1930s. While agriculture may represent the archetypal case, continuity, resulting to a significant extent from the existence and activities of a policy network, was also the hallmark of other policy areas considered in the Marsh and Rhodes book, notably smoking, nuclear power, diet and health, health services and sea defence. (Marsh 1998: 11)⁴⁰

One of the more important outcomes of the policy network, from an outsider's perspective, is the regularity that it produces. Alternative views and approaches are disruptive to the network and will tend to meet with resistance from the network. That those in the network are often beneficiaries of the network is yet another problem, at least from the perspective of those who are not involved in the network.

The extent to which many Australians may feel excluded from the discursive relationships in which the problem of Aborigines are constructed and managed may well reflect actual exclusion. That this will fuel a sense of elite domination of Australian politics seems unsurprising. To defend expertise in this field may well be to defend elite domination. The exclusion that results may well be desirable, but it is exclusion and reflects the relatively ability of different groups in Australia to mobilise the intellectual capital necessary for participation in the construction of and policy making concerning "social problems".

Conclusion

Unlike many other Australian intellectuals, I do not find it easy to respond to One Nation. In part, because I do not have their belief in the truth, especially the truth of their own position. In part, because some of the issues that One Nation raises are hard to resolve without resorting to essentialism or ignoring the problems that the issues seem to raise. Of course, One Nation will have a limited effect on Australian politics and society. Those who speak on its behalf are not well positioned to influence contemporary political debates. These debates will remain the preserve of the major parties and the intellectuals whose response to One Nation has been to deny it legitimacy. Those who rail against One Nation will remain the winners in the power struggles that are politics and knowledge. Whether or not this is an appropriate response is not clear.

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¹ In this I am following, though not quite reproducing' King's formulation, which I will discuss below.

² This may only be part of the story, as those of us watching the results for the Western Australian election in 2001?? had great difficulty interpreting early figures due to the fact that One Nation directed preferences away from sitting members and made predictions as to results in any particular seat much harder to produce.

³ The question of who is to blame for One Nation (Newman 1998) indicates something of the antipathy to which I refer.

⁴ See, and this list is by no means exhaustive, Stokes 2000: 23-41; Melleuish 1997; Crofts 1998 and Pakulski 1998.

⁵ The most interesting aspect of this claim is that it is made in the journal *Quadrant*. This is a journal in which recent contributors have railed against "Political Correctness". PC intellectuals, according to one contributor to this journal: have as their bastions the ABC and the Australian newspaper (Partington 2000: 30-1); exercise thought control through 'the ABC, the Murdoch press and the rest of the PC media'; and 'have controlled art galleries, museums, theatres and educational institutions for a quarter of a century and more.' (32)

⁶ See, for example, Burnyeat 1983.

⁷ See Hookway 1990: 4-7.

⁸ 'Accordingly, I do not believe that a "drive to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but rather than another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument.' (Nietzsche 1968: 203) 'But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened with the Stoics still happens today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; to cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the "creation of the world," to the *causa prima*.' (206)

⁹ Kelly claim that we have experienced the end of certainty is somewhat odd. (Kelly 1992) Perhaps he meant the end of a certainty, which has been readily replaced by another certainty.

¹⁰ I have ignored, for example, the second part of *The Truth*.

¹¹ 'Whether Hanson is or is not authentic is not my concern. The point that I am driving towards is that she is reintroducing into political discourse the dimension of authenticity.' (Segal 1999: 161)

¹² This is not true of all recent immigrants. For 'many Asian migrants respect our Australian values. They speak English. They understand how our legal system works. They want the same things for

their kids as other Australians—a fair go, a good education and a chance to improve themselves.’ (Australia 1996c: 8095)

¹³ Hanson’s defence of the pork industry from competition from imports reflected the fact that the ‘industry is mostly made up of family farms and is perhaps one of the best examples of a Australian farming as a small business.’ (Australia 1998b: 4696)

¹⁴ ‘Steelmaking is a tradition in Newcastle. A tradition that has been passed down from father to son and fed local families for generations – how betrayed they must feel.’ (One Nation 1997b)

¹⁵ ‘The demise of the Australian manufacturing industry has accentuated the serious unemployment problems caused by the misguided policies implemented by successive Australian governments since 1973. Research has consistently shown that a strong manufacturing sector is essential for employment growth. Manufacturing currently employs 1.2 million Australians and provides many flow on job opportunities. Manufacturing contributes approximately one third of the value of national exports. It is quite clear that Australia’s future is dependent on the prosperity of the manufacturing sector.’ (One Nation 2001a)

¹⁶ ‘liberally-minded people are ambivalent about national identity, and they tend to reject ethno-nationalism. They see the macro-social collectivity of attachment as a *society* which is a large scale voluntary (civic) *association*. Thus conceived society—an ‘imagined community’ that is seen as open and inclusive—is the main and preferred object of social attachment and solidarity. This is reflected by and engendered in the institution of citizenship, strong *civic identity*, and robust civic engagement.’ (Pakulski and Tranter 2000: 37-8)

¹⁷ ‘To be a part of a nation, according to ethno-nationalist ideology, one has to share ‘blood and territory’—a criterion reflected in the traditional legislation which specific national membership either in terms of *ius sanguinis* (by blood, that is, birth) or *ius soli* (by living in a certain territory and adopting a certain lifestyle).’ (Pakulski and Tranter 2000: 37)

¹⁸ Rather, then, than consider the use of reason to be an ineffective strategy, as Segal does, I understand the employment of reasons as a discursive strategy (i.e., as the exercise of power.). Segal is right, however, in believing that the employment of reasons will be ineffective. Of course we as ‘good rational’ citizens point out that the above supporter of One Nation is ‘irrational’, that he is grossly generalising and that his fear is unfounded. But even this is not going to stop him or hundreds of other people grounding their convictions in their experience of fear. A mistake made by many opponents of nationalism is to think that by making the irrationalism of national sentiments visible and clear we thereby wipe it away. (Segal 1999: 162) ‘Here David Oldfield in particular and One Nation in general are not even challenged by what rationalists believe to be a challenge to their position. They take it as axiomatic that detached reason is not finely tuned to the contingencies of everyday life. (Segal 1999: 163)

¹⁹ ‘In turn this suggest that in the presence of nationalism we cannot take fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, reason, truth, myth and emotion for granted but need to engage in a dialogue about fundamentals and not simply assume that we can critique the fundamental beliefs of nationalism while taking our own fundamental beliefs in reason for granted. Indeed the desire to reduce nationalism to our own epistemology amounts to an act of thought colonisation.’ (Segal 1999: 160)

²⁰ ‘Patriotism, citizenship, and cultural identity used to go together. Americans came from every part of the globe, but they tried to meld what they had once been into the new culture they entered. The “melting pot” was, to some extent, a myth, and it had a lot of lumps; but, for better or worse, it was the national ideal. And it resulted in a remarkably unified country, despite the diverse origins of the people who composed it. Being an American meant not simply holding a passport but sharing a cultural identity and affirming a political loyalty. Today, for many people, this notion seems quaint and even undesirable. There is no single cause of this. Rather it stems from a variety of causes—particularly immigration, multiculturalism, and globalisation. But the cumulative effect has been to undermine the bedrock of national cohesion and identity. And, as a result, the United

States may be undergoing a transformation into the world's first post-national society with consequences that we cannot foresee.' (Steel 1998: 13)

²¹ See Brown 1998.

²² That national identity may be an important part of marketing campaigns is further grounds for suspicion. See Mazur 2000.

²³ 'Immigration no longer implies a once-and-for-all transition – now immigrants form communities and maintain their language and ethnic identities over generations. Often they see themselves as diasporas – transnational cultural communities that maintain links with their homelands and with people of similar origins throughout the world.' (Castles 1998: 105)

²⁴ 'Furthermore, it is dangerous to reject the fears underpinning One Nation's development as irrational. They are fears that form part of any 'multicultural' or 'melting pot' society. The meeting of strangers, a part of the fear of migrants, always brings elements of stranger fear and anxiety – and excitement – with them. Sociological and psychological literature is full of references to the threat played by the strangeness of the other in anticipating the destabilising of my own identity. Indeed, Zigmund Bauman has claimed that nationalism arises as a response to an anxiety experienced in the face of the stranger. (Segal 1999: 163) 'In the face of the anxiety of finitude [which is a cause of nationalism], it is of no use to preach the gospel of economic determinism or epistemological rationalism...' (Segal 1999: 164)

²⁵ See Brown (2000) for a discussion of civic nationalism.

²⁶ 'There is still a tendency, in matters of national belonging, to regard pluralism or dualism of identity as an untidiness to be suppressed, rather than a positive quality to be celebrated.' (McMillan 1996: 33)

²⁷ Feminists, on the other hand, may not be able to do much with One Nation. For, as Curthoys and Johnson point out, Hanson 'is appealing not only to those men feeling directly threatened by multiculturalism and feminism, but also those men threatened by changes in the rural and industrial sphere that have led to the disappearance of many traditional male jobs.' (1998: 105)

²⁸ See Ramet 2000

²⁹ See Jones 1999.

³⁰ 'The central idea of this paper is that the transformation of our society requires a new form of multicultural citizenship. This may be characterised provisionally as a system of rights and obligations which protect the integrity of the individual while recognising that individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts.' (Castles 1997: 9)

³¹ Deveau has noted 'the uneasy relationship between claims for collective group rights by certain national minorities – including claims for self-government – and liberal, individual rights, which are critical to the protection of sex equality.' (2000: 522)

³² 'Divided loyalties are easier to juggle these days because of the revolution in travel and communications. With cheap flights and low phone rates it is possible for millions of immigrants – as it is for their American-born children – to live physically and psychologically in two worlds. Today, immigrating to the United States in effect means never really having to say goodbye. And it can mean never really feeling loyalty to the "host country."' (Steel 1998: 14)

³³ (See Australia 1996a: 3862) A corollary of this exclusion is an amplified voice for 'financial markets, international organisations, world bankers, investment companies and big business people.' (Australia 1996a: 3862)

³⁴ 'The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 is supposed to guarantee that no-one will be disadvantaged on the basis of race. Unfortunately, the loophole in the act is the provision to discriminate positively. Having this loophole and using it to discriminate positively for one group results in negative discrimination against others. Whereas pastoralists are only compensated for lost production from mining on their leases, Aboriginals are tremendously advantaged by having the right to negotiate with miners for a share of the profits. This creates insurmountable barriers to investment, jobs and family financial security unless you are an Aboriginal.' (Australia 1998b: 4506)

³⁵ This industry is not purely a local product. For 'it is imperative that the Australian people know and understand the international forces driving the Aboriginal industry and the flawed and divisive conception of native title. (Australia 1997c: 8898)

³⁶ That One Nation draws support from relatively affluent areas reminds us that racism is alive and well in Australian society.

³⁷ As Jackman found, after a study of popular and candidate opinions with respect to 'ostensibly 'racial' issues the electorate appears to have more conservative attitudes than even the average coalition candidate, and considerably to the right of the average ALP candidate's opinions.' (Jackman 1998: 172)

³⁸ Jagger has provided an interesting post-structuralist account of a discursive formation that produces and regulates the object "glue sniffers". 'The analysis is based on the view that knowledge originally produced by diverse experts (epidemiologists, psychiatrists, social workers, medical personnel, criminologists and so forth) is intrinsically linked to official discussions of "glue-sniffing". My argument is that only those expert discourses (or aspects of these) which are compatible with government's existing political programme or, at least, do not radically disturb it, will be taken up and used in the formulation of policy. Further, the sovereignty of a particular knowledge – that which suppresses and silences other knowledges in promoting its own vision – is maintained by repressing contradictions and reconstructing paradox as coherence. As Foucault has pointed out, the key to power in the modern era is the acceptance by all that there exists 'an ideal continuous smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity of contradictions, and resolves them in the calm unity of coherent thought'. This process was adopted by government ministers, I maintain, in producing Official Discourse on "glue sniffing". For in promoting their own version of events, ministers deployed certain "practices of exclusion". Some topics were seen as "irrelevant", some statements were construed as "illegitimate" and some speakers were disqualified as authorised speakers. By doing this, government ministers could resist pressures from MPs, the media, parents and so forth, and rule out certain possibilities for action on the grounds that they were "impracticable" and "undesirable".' (Jagger 1997: 446)

³⁹ Marsh identifies an American usage that 'emphasised regular contacts between individuals within interest groups, bureaucratic agencies and government which provided the basis for sub-government.' (Marsh 1998: 4) 'Sub-governments are clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine decisions in a given substantive area of policy ... A typical sub-government is composed of members of the House and/or Senate members of Congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats and representatives of private groups and organisations interested in the policy area.' (Ripley and Franklin as quoted in Marsh 1998: 4)

⁴⁰ 'Policy networks are political structures, although, of course, not unchanging structures. The relationships within the networks are structural because they: define the roles which actors play within networks; prescribe the issues which are discussed and how they are dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organisational imperatives, so that, at least, there is a major pressure to maintain the network. Networks involve the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour. They are organisations which shape attitudes and behaviour. Networks result from repeated behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decision makers of taking difficult decisions; they help routinize behaviour. They simplify the policy process by limiting actions, problems and solutions.' (Marsh 2000: 5-6)