In the study of Sarvāstivādin theory of araNā, I find a quite interesting point that an arhat’s
knowledge of non-dispute is a virtue or quality developed especially to help others rather than
himself. This is something rarely mentioned in the Mahāyāna tradition. In this tradition,
when compared with the idea of a bodhisattva, an arhat’s effort is believed to be
“self-centered” and “ego-based”. But how far this claim could be true? With an attempt to
answer this question, this paper wishes to provide a Sarvāstivādin perspective on an Arhat’s
altruism through an investigation to the notion of araNā from both classic Chinese and
Sanskrit sources.
1. raNa, saraNa and araNA
Literally raNa means battle (as an object of delight), war, combat, fight, conflict etc.1 In the
Buddhist context, however, it does not refer to the actual war among countries etc, but
connotes the idea of verbal and mental dispute, contention and the like. The SarvAstivAda
specks of three types of dispute (raNa): 1) the dispute with regard to defilement (kleZa-raNa), 2)
the dispute with regard to the aggregates (skandha-raNa), and 3) the dispute with regard to
speech (vāg-raNa). According to the Abhidharma-mahAvibhASa-śAstra (here after as MVS), the
dispute with regard to defilement refers to the 108 kinds of defilements. The dispute with
regard to the aggregates refers to death. The dispute with regard to quarrel refers to the
sentient beings who humiliate/insult each other through contradictive words.2
SaraNa and araNA are a pair of terms directly derived from the term raNa.. Grammatically,
saraNa means that which have dispute or with-dispute (sa-raNa), whereas araNA means that do
not have dispute or non-dispute (a-raNa). What do they actually refer to? The SarvAstivAda
differentiates them from a number of aspects, one of which is with-outflow (sAsrava) and
outflow-free (anAsrava), i.e. the with-dispute (saraNa) dharma stands for the with-outflow
dharma, and the non-dispute (araNA) dharma stands for the outflow-free dharma. 3 They are
in fact just one pair of terms employed by the SarvAstivAda to analyze all dharmas, and they
are found closely related with other analytical devices of dharma in one of the basic treatises
(mUlaśAStra) of SarvAstivAda Abhidharma, AbhidharmaprakaraNa-śAstra as follows:
“Question: How many of the twelve abodes (Ayatana-s) are with-dispute (saraNa) and how many of
them are non-dispute (araNA)?
Answer: Ten have dispute (raNa) and two - the abode of mind (mano-Ayatana) and the abode of
mental-object (dharma-Ayatana) - need to be analyzed, i.e., if they are with-outflow (sAsrava) are
with-dispute (saraNA); if they are outflow-free (anAsrava) are non-dispute (araNA). Just as the case of
with-dispute (saraNa) and non-dispute (araNa), world (loka/laukika) and transcendent world
(lokottara), falling into spheres (dhAtu) and not falling into spheres, having attachment to taste and
1 Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Sir Monier-williams, New Delhi, 1988, 3rd reprint, P863c
2 T27n1545, p899a22-24
3 T26, p689a
2
non-attachment to taste, basis of attachment and basis of detachment, 4 conducive to
bondage(bandhana) or not conducive to bondage, conducive to grasping (upAdAna) or not conducive
to grasping, conducive to envelopment (paryavathAna) or not conducive to envelopment, should be
understood in the same way. ”5
The above distinction of saraNa and araNA seems to too gross and vague. We find a clearer
distinction of them in the discussions of MVS as follows:
“Moreover, the Bhagavat is the one who accords with dharma (dharmayukatavAdin), the heretics and
so on are those who do not accord with dharma (adharmayukatavAdins), the former does not have
dispute (araNA) by nature, and the latter have dispute (saraNa) by nature.
Moreover, the Buddha accords with the world concerning the conventional [truth], whereas they (i.e.
the heretics etc.) do not accord with the Buddha concerning the absolute [truth]
Moreover, it is because of the fact that the Bhagavat is good at cutting off the two roots of dispute,
namely desire (tRSNA) and view (dRSTi). Since the Buddha has permanently cut off these two roots, he
is said to have non-dispute (araNA), where the worldly people have not cut off [these two roots], they
are said to have dispute (saraNa).
The Bhadanta says: ‘The Bhagavat is the one who accords with dharma (dharmayukatavAdin), the
heretics and the like are those who do not accord with dharma (adharmayukatavAdins), the former
does not have dispute (araNA) by nature, and the latter have dispute (saraNa) by nature’, this is just like
in the case of a horse, whose steps are either higher or lower if crossing through dangerous place; if
walking in the flat road, there is not any difference in its steps.
Moreover, the Buddha is the one who sees truth/meaning (artha), dharma, wholesomeness (kuśala)
and flexibility ((karmanyatva), therefore he is said to have non-dispute (araNA), whereas the worldily
people are not so, therefore they are said to have dispute (saraNa).”6
The above passages reveal that an ordinary person cannot have non-dispute (araNA), they can
only be those who have dispute (saraNa), because they still have the roots of dispute, and
because they have not seen the truth and have not acted in accordance with it. The Buddha
however has permanently cut off the roots of dispute, and sees the truth and acts in
accordance with it; he is the one who has no dispute (araNA). Dispute (raNa) here stresses
more on defilements rather than others, and non-dispute indicates great wisdom through
which the roots of dispute can be cut off and truth can be seen. It is under this connotation,
non-dispute (araNA) is deemed as one of the virtues (guNas) unique to the Buddha as well as an
arhat only.
2. The knowledge of non-dispute (araNA-jJAna) of an arhat
According to the SarvAstivAda, among the virtues (guNa) of the Buddha, there are three types
of virtues common to an arhat only, namely, the knowledge of non-dispute (aranājJāna), the
knowledge of resolution (praNdhijJāna), and freedom from hindrance (pratisaMvit) and so on.
Here, araNā means non-dispute or absence of contention with regard to defilements, for “One
4 The defiled sensations of joy (sukha), sorrow (daurmanasya) and equanimity (upekSA) are the bases of attachment;
conversely the wholesome sensations of the three are the bases of detachment.
5 T26, 696c
6 T27, 255c
3
should know that here it (araNā) refers to the dispute with regard to defilements, because it
aims at obstructing sentient beings from producing defilements.” 7
A knowledge that is produced to obstruct/prevent the dispute with regard to defilements is
called the knowledge of non-dispute (araNājJāna). The path leading to the production of such
knowledge is called the path/practice of non-dispute (araNā-pratipat). According to
AbhidharmakośabhASaya (here after as AKB), non-dispute (araNā) is a knowledge that is
produced by an Arhat in order to prevent others from producing defilements by taking the
Arhat himself as their object:
“Herein the so-called non-dispute [means]: a certain Arhat, knowing that the suffering of all beings
originates from defilements, and knowing himself as being distinguished as one who is worth of
receiving offerings, and desiring to obstruct the arising of defilements of others who take him as their
object, produces a knowledge of such a form due to which the dispute of others does not arise in
whatever manner. No craving (rāga) of anyone which takes him as their object is produced, neither is
hatred (dveSa) or pride (māna). This path does not cause anyone whosoever to dispute at all, therefore
it is called non-dispute (aranā).”8
The ideal is that an Arhat himself has abandoned all defilements and therefore deserves
offering. Those who still have not liberated themselves might give rise to defilements by
taking him as their object. Out of compassion, he develops a special type of knowledge to
obstruct the production of defilements because of him. According to MVS this is possible
only at the time when an Arhat has reached well his own inner defilements as well as those of
others which are outside himself:
“Question: what is the path/practice leading to non-dispute (araNA)?
Answer: when Arhats have reached well their inner [defilements], but their outer [defilements] have
not been reached well. Only if they have also reached well their outer [defilements], is the path
/practice leading to non-dispute so called. What does the time of inner refer to? It refers to all
defilements in the series (saMtati) of oneself. What does the time of the outer refer to? It refers to all
defilements in the series of others. Obstructing these types of defilements is called ‘reaching well’.
All Arhats have abandoned the defilements which arise in their own series. There is however no
certainty for them [to obstruct] defilements which arise in others series. If they can also obstruct [the
arising of this type of defilement], [this path/practice] is called the path leading to non-dispute
(araNa).
Some say that ‘time’ refers to the three periods of a day, i.e., the beginning of the day, the middle of
the day, and the later period of the day. During all the three periods of time, [one can]
obstruct/counteract all defilements – this is called “reaching well”. All Arhats have abandoned
defilements of their own series during all the three periods of time, it is however not certain with
regard to defilements of others’ series during all the three periods of time. If they can also
obstruct/counteract [this type of defilements] – this is call the path/practice leading to non-dispute.
7 T27n1545, p899a25
8 AKB, p417, 2-5: tatra araNA nAma kazcit eva arhan klezaprabhavaM sattvAnAM duHkhaM viditva AtmAnaM
ca dakSiNIya-vizeSaM pareSAM tat-AlambanaM kleza-utpAdaM parihartukAmah tAdRzaM jJAnam utpAdayati bhena
pareSAM sarvathA api raNaM notpAdayati / na kasyacit tat-Alambano rAgah utpadyate dveSah mAnah vA / na eSA
pratipat kaMcit eva raNayati iti araNA
4
Some say that ‘time’ refers to the six periods of a day, i.e., both day as well as night are divided into
three periods: the beginning, the middle and the later. During all the six periods of time, [one can]
abandon all defilements – this is called ‘reaching well’. All Arhats have abandoned defilements of
their own series during all the six periods of time. This is however not certain with regard to
defilements of others’ during all the six periods of time. If they can also obstruct [this type of
defilements] – this is call the path/practice leading to non-dispute.”9
From the above analyses, it is clear that either in the three periods or six periods of a day, an
arhat can “reach well” defilements of his own series and obstruct them from arising, because
he has abandoned/cut off defilements in his own series. Nevertheless, he can not assure the
non-arising of defilements from others’ series. It is only when he obstructs the arising of
defilements from others’ series by taking himself as their object that an arhat is said to follow
a path leading to non-dispute(araNA). This should be the view of the orthodox SarvAstivAdins.
GhoSaka etcetera on the other hand holds that dispute (raNa) is talked about in relation to only
others’ defilements, but not in relation to one’s own. Therefore, an Arhat need not necessarily
be without defilements within himself.
“Ven. GhoSaka says: it is not with regard to the dispute regarding defilements in one’s own series that
the path/practice leading to non-dispute is named. It is only because one is able to obstruct the dispute
of defilements arising in the series of others that it is named the path/practice leading to non-dispute.
Why is this so? – Because dispute is a name which is with regard to others, but not with regard to
oneself.”10
GhoSaka was one of the four great SarvAstivAda masters, well known for his theory of
“lakşaņa-anyathātva”,11 but he was also a DArSTAntika, who held a more rational view and
could well be the forerunner of SautrAtika. Here, in his view, as long as one is able to obstruct
the arising of defilements in others’ series one is said to follow the path of non-dispute (araNa),
as the name of dispute (raNa) is established with regard to others only, but not with regard to
oneself. This might hint that an arhat, who still has the arising of defilements in his own series,
may also produce a knowledge of non-dispute (araNA-jJAna) and follow the path of
non-dispute (araNa-pratipat) simply by obstructing the arising of defilements in other’s series.
An arhat must have abandoned all of his defilements, but the SarvAstivAda accepts that an
arhat is possible to fall to certain degree and his defilements may reappear unless he has
attained both the knowledge of destruction (kSAyajJAna) together with the knowledge of
non-arising (anutpAdajJana). The former guarantees the destruction of defilements is complete,
whereas the later insures that these defilements will not arising again in his series. GhoSka
emphasizes the obstruction of defilements in others’ series only, he might indicate that arhats
of all degrees can follow the path of non-dispute (araNapratipad). In contrast, by stressing
obstructing the arising of defilements in both one’s own as well as others’ series, the orthodox
SarvAstivAdins tend to confine the path of non-dispute (araNapratipad) only to arhats of the
highest degree, the asamaya-vimuktas:
“[Question:] Who are the persons (pudgAla) [in whom non-dispute (araNa) can arise]?
9 T27n1545, p898a18-b2
10 T27, p899c
11 According to this theory, when a dharma operates in the three periods of time, future, present and past, there is a
difference/change of characteristic of the dharma, but not of its essence. Thus, establish the main thesis of “sarvaM asti”.
5
[Answer:] they must be the nobles, not the ordinary; they are the non-learner (aśaika), not the learner
(śaikSa). Among the non-learners (aśaikSas), they are the asamaya-vimuktas only, not the
samaya-vimuktas.12 Why is so? Because it is only in those who has obtained mastery over
concentration (samAdhi) and whose series is no longer controlled by defilements can it (non-dispute)
arise. ”13
Vasubandhu seems to have taken GoSka’s stand that non-dispute (araNA) is talked about only
with regard to defilements of others’ seriese, but agreed with the orthodox view that only the
immovable arhats can obtain the knowledge of non-dispute (araNAjJA), and not any other arhat,
because another [type of Arhat] is sometimes not able to obstruct a dispute due to defilements
even from his own series.14 That is to say, if an arhat is not able to obstruct defilements
arising from his own series, how would one expect him to be able to obstruct those of others’
series?
In the same context, MVS gives us the flowing further explanations on the mechanism
through which an arhat obstructs the arising of others’ defilements, objects to be obstructed by
him and aspects to define his knowledge of non-dispute as follows:
“Question: why is obstructing defilements called ‘reaching well’?
Answer: the name of ‘reaching well’ is so called because it is only by the arising of
understanding/wisdom (prajJā) that the defilements of others can be obstructed.
“Question: What dharma does the non-dispute (araNā) refer to?
Answer: that which makes the series of others operate without any impurities. That is, the defilements
can be conducive to stains and various impurities. Those, who have obtained non-dispute, cannot be
stained or polluted by defilements in others’ series, in the sense that they stay far away from the
defilements in the series of others.
Some say: the words should be read as: there is no remaining defilements operating with regard to the
series of others. That is, those who have obtained non-dispute, if they have abandoned permanently
and completely the defilements in their own series; likewise, they can also obstruct the defilements
arising in the series of others, assuring there is no defilement remained. In other words, [non-dispute
defined here] is in the sense that one obstructs all that which make others give rise to defilements in
their series.
Some say: the words should be read as: [the mind of an Arhat] operates non-distinctively with regard
to others’ series. That is, one who has obtained non-dispute, if one could obstruct the defilements in
the series of others who are close to one, making them not to arise, likewise, they can also obstruct
defilements in the series of others who are against one and who have neutral feelings towards one,
making them not to appear – this is the meaning of obstructing equally the defilement in the series of
others.
12 asamaya-vimukta is one who has liberated without the condition of time, i.e. his liberation
is a complete one, and will not retroprogress at any time, he is an immovable arhat.
Samaya-vimukta refers to one has liberated understand to condition of time, i.e. at the time of
difference condition, this liberation may not be safe.
13 T27, p899c
14 AKB, p417, 10-12: akopya-dharmaNaH / na anyasya arhataH / anysa hi svasaMtAnAt api kadAcit klezaraNaM
parihartu na zaknoti
6
Question: what distinction is there with regard to the non-operation of impurities when one has
reached well the outer [defilements]?
Answer: when one has reached well the outer [defilements], understanding/wisdom (prajJā) operates
without impurities [in one’s own series], and defilements do not arise [in another’s series].”15
Wisdom/understanding (prajJA) is the mechanism through which an arhat abandons
permanently all defilements in his own series, obstructs arising of defilements in others’ series.
Therefore, it is clear the intrinsic nature (svabhAva) of non-dispute is understanding (prajJA).
To be more precise, the self-nature of araNā is conventional knowledge (saMvrtijJana),
because its objects are worldly things. As in the practice of non-dispute concentration is also
involved, some argue that concentration should be the intrinsic nature of non-dispute:
“Question: what is the intrinsic nature of the path of non-dispute, concentration (samAdhi) or
understanding (prajJA)? If so, what is the fallacy? If it is concentration, how can one explain the
words? For instance, ‘at the time of reaching well the outer is called the path of non-dispute’, here
‘reaching well’ is understanding (prajJA).if it is understanding (prajJA), how can one explain the
words at other place, such as ‘one should practice the concentration of non-dispute (araNA-samAdhi)’?
Answer: one should say that it is understanding (prajJA).
Question: if so, why is it said that one should practice the concentration of non-dispute
(araNA-samAdhi)’?
Answer: it should be said thus: one should practice the understanding of non-dispute
(araNA-prajJA).but ‘one should practice the concentration of non-dispute (araNA-samAdhi)’is so said
here, it is to reveal that non-dispute (araNA) coexists with concentration (samAdhi), therefore,
concentration (samAdhi) is said, but in the actual fact, understanding (prajJA) should be said to be the
intrinsic nature of non-dispute (araNA).”16
Both understanding (prajJA) and concentration (samAdhi) are universal dharmas
(mahAbhUmikas) 17of SarvAstivAda system. Whenever a mind (citta) operates, these two and
other eight necessarily co-exist with the mind. This does not mean they all function equally at
each moment. In the case of non-dispute (araNA), understanding exercises the predominate
function; therefore the state/nature of the mind is defined by understanding. This can be
proved from the later MahAyAna text of MahAprajJApArmita-śAstra, when SubhUti is said to be
the best of the Buddhist disciples who have obtained the concentration of
non-dispute(araNā-samādhi), 18 it is meant to say that he has the best knowledge in
understanding the ideal of emptiness (śUnyatA), but not his practice of concentration. Having
said this, concentration is indeed an integral aspect of the path of non-dispute. According to
the SarvAstivAda, it belongs to the stage of the fourth dhyAna, because it is the best of the easy
paths (乐通行道, le tong xing dao).19
15 T27n1545, p898b3-22
16 T27, p899a
17 The ten universal dharmas are: sensation (vedanA), volition (cetanA), ideation (saMjJA), predilection (chanda), contact
(sparśa), understanding (prajJA), mindfulness (smRti), mental application (manaskAra), resolve/determination (adhimokSa) and
concentration (samAdhi).
18 T25, p136c
19 AKB, p417, 9: caturthadhyAna bhUmikA sukhapratipadAm agratvAt /
7
As to objects of non-dispute (araNā), according to AKB, they must be defilements which
are in the future, pertaining to kāmadhātu, and which have real object, for, “the defilements,
which do not have a real object (avastukāstuh kleśāh), can not be obstructed, because they are
the object of their own entire bhūmi of the universal defilements (sarvatagāNa kleśa).”20 It is
quite understandable that the objects must be of the future type and pertaining to kāmadhātu,
because an Arhat is supposed to obstruct the arising of defilements of others by taking himself
as their objects. In other words, such defilements have not yet arisen, therefore in the future.
Moreover, this type of defilements is very gross and is possessed by the human beings of the
three continents of the kāmadhātu.21 Furthermore, it should be noted that the defilements
must be those which have a real object, and not the sarvatagāNa type of defilement, the
defilement which operates in all bhūmi-s and common to everyone. Otherwise, they cannot be
obstructed by an Arhat. Suppose an Arhat says this to a person, “Do not regard me as an ātma
(Soul or Self)”, this person can still regard other people as ātma, thus this kind of defilement
can not be obstructed. According to SaMghabhadra, this is because the avastukāstu kleza-s
when arising takes their objects whatever they may be collectively.22 MVS explains this in
terms of the defilements of svalakSaNa type:
“Question: is it the [practice of non-dispute] to obstruct defilements of others with self characteristics
(sva-lakSaNa) or common characteristics (sāmānya-lakSaNa)?
Answer: self characteristics alone can be obstructed, but not common characteristics. Why is this so?
A defilement with common characteristics, accordingly as the case may be, at one time takes as its
object collectively the body obtained from one dhātu, one bhUmi, one sthāna, one jāti, and one
location, regarding it as Self (ātma) and what pertains to self (ātmIya), as annihilation or permanence,
or as without a cause, or as the first cause, or as what can purify, or as that which gives rise to the
ignorance of doubt due to which one does not know that [the defilements which are] permanently
endowed with and operating in all sentient beings cannot be obstructed. Hence, [the practice of
non-dispute] can only obstruct/avoid defilements with self-characteristics.”23
3. An arhat’s altruist act found in the path of non-dispute
How can an Arhat obstruct the dispute with regard to defilements? MVS provides us with
five ways of practice with details as follows:
“Moreover, by practicing/following five kinds of dharma, that Arhat can make defilements in the
series of others not to arise. What are the five kinds of dharma? 1. Purifying one’s deportment
(iryā-patha); 2. communicating/responding people with either words or silence; 3. Making a proper
judgment with regard to staying in a certain place or leaving it; 4. Making a distinction as to whether
to receive an offering or not, 5. Observing pudgala (self).
1. Purifying one’s deportment: the Arhat is previously sitting at one place. If another person
approaches him, he then discerns his mind [in this manner]: ‘by what form of deportment can [i]
make that person not to give rise to fetters (baddha)?’ If he knows that by this form of
20 AKB, p417, 17-18: avastukAstuh klezAh na zakyAH parihartuM sarvatra-gANAM sakala-svabhUmi-AlambanatvAt
21 AKB, p417, 14: avastukAstuh klezAh na zakyAH parihartuM sarvatra-gANAM sakala-svabhUmi-AlambanatvAt /
SaMghabhadra explains that this is because humans in these three continents are of strong and sharp nature. (also
see T29n1562,p750b13-14 )
22 T29n1562,p750b15-16:
23 T27n1545, p899a07-12
8
deportment (i.e. sitting) that person gives rise to fetters, he then gives up this form and takes other
forms of deportment. If fetters do not arise in [that person], he then keeps his previous form. It is
the same case with regard to other forms of deportment.
2. Encountering people with words or silence: on seeing another person approach him, the Arhat
observes his mind [in this manner]: ‘Should I talk to him/her or be silent?” Having made this
observation, if he notices that speech would cause that person to give rise to fetters, he keeps
silent even if he badly wants to talk to the person; if he notices that silence could cause fetters rise
in that person, he then talks to the person even if he does not want to do so. Walking on the road,
if he sees two people approach him, he then observes to whom he may talk first. Having made the
observation, if he notices that when he talks to that person, it causes fetters to arise in the other,
he then talks to the other. It is the same in reverse (i.e. the first person is not happy). If he speaks
to both, and this causes both people to give rise to fetters, he then keeps silent. If he does not talk
to both, it is still the same case. If both talking and keeping silent still give arise fetters in then,
the Arhat then obstructs going along the same road in order to prevent them from giving rise to
fetters.
3. Making proper judgment as to whether to stay or leave: the Arhat observes the places where he is
about to stay and immediately makes this observation: ‘Should I stay here or should I leave?’ If
he notices that when he stays, it would cause others to give rise to fetters, he gives up that place
and leaves it, even if that place is safe and comfortable and there is an abundance of material
things, which are conducive to the kuZala dharma-s or cultivation of the ārya-s. If he notices
that by leaving that place fetters will arise in others, he forces himself to stay there, even if that
place is not safe, and there is a lack of material things, which is not conducive to kuZala dharma-s
or cultivation of the ārya-s.
4. Making a distinction as to whether to receive an offering or not: if an almsgiver is to offer him
offerings, the Arhat then observes his mind [in this manner]: ‘Should I accept the offer or not?”
Having made such observation, if he notices that by accepting the offer it will give rise to fetters
in the mind of the almsgivers, the Arhat does not accept the offer, even if it is what he needs; if
he notices that by not accepting the offer it will give rise to fetters in the mind of the almsgivers,
he then accepts the offer, even if it is not what he needs.
5. Observing pudgala (self): when the Arhat, in order to beg for food, is about to enter another’s
house in the alleys of a city or town, he observes the man and woman, the old and young in that
place, making sure that his entrance will not cause defilements to arise in the minds of them
because of himself. If he notices that this would not cause defilements to rise in the minds of
them, he then enters the house and begs for food; if he notices that this will cause defilements to
arise in the mind of them, he then does not enter the house [and beg for food], even if he is
extremely hungry. This is because [the Arhat’s] judgment is that which ensures such matter (i.e.
defilements arise in the minds of others because himself) from occurring. If all sentient beings
give rise to defilements because of seeing the Arhat, he therefore goes to a place where there are
no sentient beings, and stops taking food and dies there. This would prevent others from ever
giving rise to defilements because of him.
The Arhat, by following this five-fold practice, can therefore obstruct defilements in the series of
others, preventing them from appearing.”24
24 T27n1545, p898b23-c25
9
The above practices of an arhat tell us how an arhat would do to prevent others from giving
rise to defilements when he is in contact with others. It has become clear from our earlier
discussions that by doing so or not the Arhat himself will not give rise to defilements because
he is already a liberated person. However, in doing so, an Arhat has to restrain himself and
thus bring more inconvenience upon himself. Why would an Arhat choose to do so? MVS
further explains:
“Question: why does an Arhat, who has attained liberation, cultivate this dharma to bound/restrain
himself?
Answer: that Arhat has previously been the nature of a Bodhisattva family/clan (gotra), who cannot
bear to see sentient beings doing evil and causing suffering to themselves. In order to uplift their
suffering, [he] constantly applies his mind to reflect thus: from beginingless time, sentient beings and
I who have been bound to each other, revolving the five destines, suffering great pain and sorrow. I
who now have fortunately escaped this should in my turn help others. He makes further reflection
thus: from the beginingless time, I have been in a low and despicable position such as that of a
prostitute or a scarlet woman and so on. Hundreds and thousands of sentient beings have produced
fetters with regard me, and because of this they have suffered pain and sorrow in the ‘long night’.
Now I have escaped from craving, hatred and ignorance, and I have become the field of virtue of the
world. [When others] produce fetters with regard to me, [it will] not cause suffering to me. It is for
this reason I should now not again be the cause of [their] defilements. Hence, although an Arhat has
attained self-liberation, for the sake of sentient beings, he again initiates the practice of
non-dispute.”25
The intention of an arhat’s practice of non-dispute (araNA-pratipad) is not for the wellbeing of
himself, but to help other sentient beings. In other words, these practices of an arhat are acts
of altruism, which are not often found in the texts, but here it is quiet clear! In the MahAyAna
tradition, an arhat is generally portrayed as “self-centered” and “ego-based”, cares nothing
more than his own liberation. Putting and helping others at the first place is mostly the acts of
a bodhisattva. Because of this, some even go to the extent to claim that the intrinsic nature of
non-dispute is compassion, but this claim was declined by SaMghabhadra:
“Some say: the essence (dravya) of non-dispute (araNA) is compassion (karuNA), because one
cultivates non-dispute out of pity on sentient beings. How can one say that the non-dispute (araNā) is
different from compassion, because of entering into non-dispute by having compassion as its
gateway?
This saying does not accord to logic, as it is not certain. For, to the cultivation of non-dispute (araNā)
is not necessarily derived from compassion. The mode of activity (AkAra) of uplifting pains and
sorrows of sentient being is only to make them not to arise; contemplation (dhyAna) is the gateway
leading to it. If [non-dispute] certainly has compassion as its gateway, one still cannot say that
[non-dispute] has compassion as its intrinsic nature, for [it is the same case to say that] because
wisdom (prajJA) is initiated through concentration (samAdhi), the intrinsic nature of wisdom is
concentration.”26
An importance message given by SaMghadhadra is that an arhat’s acts of non-dispute (araNā)
are not necessarily always performed out of compassion. Could this be a distinction between
an arhat’s altruism and those of a bodhisattva? Another interesting data given in the
25 T27n1545, p898c26-899a-6
26 T29, p752b
10
explanation on the intention of an arhat’s non-dispute (araNā) is that the Arhat has previously
been the nature of a Bodhisattva family/clan (gotra). How would we interpret this? Does it
mean that an arhat’s altruistic act is due to his previous bodhisattva nature rather than his
knowledge of non-dispute? Whatever interpretation there might be, one thing for sure here is
that the practices of non-dispute discussed above are certainly acts of altruism, and the
performer is indeed an arhat.
4. Conclusion
RaNa has the basic meanings of dispute, conflict, quarrel and the like. It could refer to a
dispute either with regard to defilements, death or speech, but the dispute with regard to
defilements is the most important connotation. The Sarvāstivāda distinguishes a pair of term,
saraNa(with-dispute) and araNā(non-dispute), which are derived from raNa. They are one of
the analytical devices utilized to analyze all dharmas, just like the division of sāsrava
(with-outflow) and anāsrava (outflow-free). With-dispute (saraNa) is of with-outflow (sārava)
nature, and non-dispute (araNa) is of outflow-free (anāsrava) nature. The knowledge of
non-dispute (araNā-jGāna) is a unique virtue/quality (guNā) of a Buddha as well as an arhat
only. But it is not any arhat who can obtain the knowledge of non-dispute (araNā-jGāna),
because he must ‘reach well’ or obstruct defilements arising from both his own series and
well as others’ series at all time. Only an immovably arhat who has abandoned his
defilements permanently can obstruct defilements arising from others’ series by take himself
as the object, although some say that the name of non-dispute(araNa)is established only with
reference to others’ defilements, not that of an arhat. MVS informs us how an arhat would
obstruct the arising of defilements in others’ series by taking him as the object in five
different circumstances. An immovable arhat is already a fully liberated person, who has no
more defilement to arise. Why would he trouble to obstruct/avoid the arising of defilements
from others series? Because whether others give rise to defilements by taking him as the
object or not has no effect on him. On the contrary, doing so, it only brings him more strains
or inconvenience. The clear reason given by MVS is an arhat’s compassion. Therefore this is
no more than an altruistic act, which is quite similar to that of a bodhisattva. The text adds
more confusion by explaining that the arhat was previously of a bodhisattva nature. The
problem here is: an arhat’s altruism is due to his bodhisattva nature or his arhat nature (if we
may express this way)? Or if we put this question in this way the answer would be very easier:
does an arhat has altruism by nature?
According to Sarvāstivāda, an arhat indeed has compassion by nature! Because the
Sarvāstivāda has explicit discussions on the differences between the Buddha’s Great
Compassion (mahākaruNā) and a Listener’s (śrāvaka i.e. an arhat) compassion (karuNā).
However, we have never come cross a comparison between a bodhisattva’s compassion and
that of an arhat. In the Mahāyāna tradition, a bodhisattva is well known for his/her
compassion, little is known about an arhat’s compassion, so as to leave us an impression that
an arhat has only egoism but not altruism. Through our investigation to the Sarvāstivādin
notion of non-dispute (araNā) we find a clear evidence of an arhat’s altruism in both theory
and practice, it may somewhat different from that of a bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna tradition
though.
11
Abbreviations
AKB Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. Pradhan P., 2nd ed., Patna: K.P. Jayaswal
Research Institute, 1975.
MVS *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra, 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T27, no. 1545), tr. Xuanzang..
Ny *Nyāyānusāra, 阿毘達磨顺正理論 (T29, no. 1562), tr. Xuanzang..
T 大正新修大藏経 Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Takakusu, J., Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha,
1924-1932.
Reference
1. Pruden Leo M., tr., English translation of L’Abhidharmako a de Vasubandhu, Vols. VI, La Vallée
Poussin, Lious, de, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988.
2. Ven. Dhammajoti, K.L. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Hongkong, 2010
3. Cox, Collett Davis, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories of Existence, Tokyo: the
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1983.
This paper is only a draft, please do not quote!